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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM ANDREWS, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 13903 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a criminal proceeding brought by the State of 
Utah against William Andrews, charging him with three counts 
of criminal homecide, murder in the first degree in violation 
of Section 76-5-202, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1953) and 
two counts of aggravated robbery in violation of Section 
76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated (Supp. 1973). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
In the District Court of the Second Judicial District 
in and for Davis County, State of Utah, on November 15, 
1974, after a trial by jury, the defendant was found guilty 
of three counts of first degree murder and two counts of 
aggravated robbery. On November 20, 1974, after a hearing 
on the sentence, the jury recommended that the defendant be 
sentenced to death on all three counts of first degree 
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murder. On November 24, 1974, Judge John F. Wahlquist 
sentenced the defendant to death by shooting at 7:47 A.M., 
January 21, 1975, on all three counts of first degree murder 
and sentenced the defendant to an indefinite term of not 
less than five years to life imprisonment in the Utah State 
Prison. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks an order of this Court reversing the 
judgment rendered at the trial and or hearing on sentence of 
this cause, and a ruling remanding the cause to the trial 
court for a new trial, or in the alternative, an Order 
setting aside the sentence of death and remanding the case 
to the trial court for the imposition of the sentence of 
life imprisonment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant, William Andrews, concurs with the statement 
of the facts on pages 2 to 6 of appellant, Dale S. Pierre's 
brief on appeal with the following additions. Orrin W. 
Walker, the states chief witness, and an eye witness to the 
commission of the crime itself, testified that the defendant, 
William Andrews, was present and standing at the bottom of 
the stairs of the HiFi Shop basement when he entered on the 
night of April 22. He further testified that both defendant 
Andrews and defendant Pierre had weapons. Subsequent to his 
intial confrontation with the two defendants, Walker testified 
that the defendant Pierre's gun discharged, and that defendant 
Andrews said, "What did you do that for, man?" (Tr. 3174) Mr. 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Walker further testified that during the time that the 
defendant Pierre and Andrews were administering the caustic 
fluid and prior to the time that defendant Pierre fired the 
shots, that the two defendants engaged on numerous occasions 
in conversation and that defendant Andrews appeared to be 
nervous and upset (Tr. 3176-77). Furthermore, Walker testified 
that at one point subsequent to the administration of the 
liquid but prior to the shooting, Andrews said, !!I can't do 
it, I!m scared!" (TR. 3174, 3183). Finally, Walker testified 
that prior to Pierre committing the rape of Michelle Ansley 
and before any shots were fired at any of the victims, defendant 
Andrews went up the back stairs, out the back door, shut 
the door behind him and never re-entered the HiFi Shop again 
(Tr. 3187-88). 
ARGUMENT POINT I 
APPELLANT ANDREWS CONCURS WITH AND RE-ARGUES POINTS 
NUMBERS 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, & 8 OF THE BRIEF OF APPELLANT, 
DALE S. PIERRE. 
Defendant-Appellant Pierre's brief has exhaustively and 
authoritatively presented for this court arguements concerning 
the unconsitutionality of the death penalty, the denial of a 
fair trial and violation of due process clause because of 
prejudicial pre-trial publicity, the abuse of discretion and 
reversable error created by the court and the courts failure 
to grant appellants motion for change of venue and for 
separate trials and for allowing the testimony of Dr. Bryon 
H. Naisbett to be witnessed by the jury. The attorney for 
defendant Andrews, on numerous occassions prior to the trial Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and during the course of the trial, made appropriate motions 
concerning the above issues. That at all times said motions 
were denied. That the cases submitted in the brief of 
defendant Dale Pierre in support of the issues raised 
therein gave the court the most concise and conclusive 
support for Defendant Andrews position. Counsel for defendant, 
Andrews, has found no other cases than those already before the 
court which would assist the court in resolving these issues 
and therefore respectfully urges the court to consider those 
issues referred above as re-argued and submitted on behalf 
of Defendant Andrews and rebutted. 
ARGUEMENT POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURTS FAILURE TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION 
FOR SEQUESTRATION OF THE JURY, BETWEEN THE PERIOD OF NOVEMBER 
15, 1974, TO NOVEMBER 20, 1974, WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN LIGHT OF THE ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND 
PREJUDICIAL ATMOSPHERE SURROUNDING APPEALLANT'S TRIAL. 
Prior to the commencement of the trial on November 15, 
1974, defendant's attorney, along with the attorneys for 
defendant, Pierre, and defendant, Roberts move the trial 
court that the jury be sequestered for the duration of the 
trial so that prejudicial pre-trial publicity would be 
avoided and that a fair trial be given all the defendants. 
Judge John F. Wahlquist denied the defendant's motion saying 
that he felt proper decorum could be observed and that: every 
precautions would be taken so that the jury would not be 
influenced by outside sources. (The court should take 
4 
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careful note of Page 39 of defendant Pierre's brief on 
appeal, as evidence that even the best precautions were not 
sufficient). On November 15, 1974, defendant, Andrews, was 
found guilty of three counts of first degree murder, and at 
that time requested that the court grant, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated, 76-3-207 (1) a hearing on whether or not the 
death sentence or life imprisonment would be imposed and 
that the decision thereon be made by the jury. Because of 
the length of the trial, which had already taken four weeks, 
and the necessity of counsel obtaining additional witnesses 
for the sentencing hearing the trial judge ordered that the 
hearing be held on November 20, 1974, five days later. At 
this time, defendant's counsel renewed a request for sequestration 
of the jury for this five day period (Tr. 4114) contending 
that the jury members could be subjected to great pressure 
over the five day period from outside sources, which pressure 
could affect the sentence. Again, Judge John F. Wahlquist 
denied appellant's motion. 
It is clear that in light of all of the surrounding 
circumstances, that the jury should have been suquestered 
during the five day period between the rendering of the 
verdict and the sentencing hearing. While it is true that 
sequestration is discretionary with the judge, and that many 
factors must be considered, to-wit: expense to the State, 
time involved, inconvenience to the jury, that these types 
of considerations must necessarily be viewed in light of the 
more serious effects that failure to sequester a jury can 
have in a case of this nature. As has been noted in appellant 
Dale Pierre's brief and reaffirmed here, not only was this Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a trial involving a capitol offense, wherein a potential 
death sentence was at issue, but was beyond a doubt the most 
widely publicized homecide case in recent Utah history. The 
trial judge admitted that the pre-trial publicity was so 
pervasive that he was certain there was no one who did not 
have some familarity with the case. By the time the jury's 
verdict was entered, four weeks of testimony had transpired, 
and had been graphically protrayed daily to the public by 
both written and electronic media. Although the trial judge 
frequently warned jurors not to expose themselves to media 
reports, the sheer volume of news coupled with the public 
reaction could not have been barred from even the most 
conscientious juror. The obvious remedy for the court to 
protect both the defendant and the jurors was sequestration. 
The trial judge; however, chose to ignore the obvious, under 
the shield of "judicial disgression". In the case of 
Shepherd vs. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 363, the United States 
Supreme Court indicated that where there is a reasonable 
liklihood of prejudicial news coverage attentant to a trial 
which will prevent a fair trial, the jury should be sequestered 
and in fact that the sequestration of the jury was something 
that should be raised sua sponte by the court. Therefore it 
is clear that the Supreme Court intended that complete 
"judicial discretion" in the area of sequestration be tempered 
by the surrounding circumstances. It is inconceivable that 
the type of pressure brought about by the publicity of this 
case could not have effected the jurors during the five day 
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period between the verdict and the sentencing. Not only 
were newspapers and electronic media filled with stories 
about the trial during this period of time, but no doubt 
jurors were subjected to close scrutiny by friends, neighbors 
and other acquaintances. While the logistics of sequestering 
a jury for four to five weeks is something that the court 
should and apparently did give great weight, sequestration 
for only a five day period was not a great sacrifice on the 
part of the state and whatever expense wpi;d be incurred was 
outweighed by the inherently prejudicial effect of non-
sequestration at that time. The trial judge should have 
sequestered the jury to protect its members from the influence 
of both the constant and pervasive news coverage of the 
trial and the attitude of the community. This failure to do 
so was an abuse of his discretion and denied the appellant a 
fair trial, and further violated his right to due process 
under the 14th Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the foregoing points, the Appellant 
respectfully submits that the judgment rendered at trial be 
reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for the 
purpose of a new trial, or that, in the alternative, this 
Court should Order that the Appellant's sentence of death be 
set aside, and direct the trial court to impose the sentence 
of life imprisonment. 
Respectfully submited, 
JOHN T. CAINE 
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